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Traditionally, network operators have used simple flat-rate broadband data plans for both wired and wire-
less network access. But today, with the popularity of mobile devices and exponential growth of apps, videos,
and clouds, service providers are gradually moving towards more sophisticated pricing schemes. This decade
will therefore likely witness a major change in the ways in which network resources are managed, and the
role of economics in allocating these resources. This survey reviews some of the well-known past broad-
band pricing proposals (both static and dynamic), including their current realizations in various consumer
data plans around the world, and discusses several research problems and open questions. By exploring the
benefits and challenges of pricing data, this paper attempts to facilitate both the industrial and the aca-
demic communities’ efforts in understanding the existing literature, recognizing new trends, and shaping
an appropriate and timely research agenda.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In November 1996, AOL, the largest U.S. Internet Service Provider1 (ISP) of the time,
switched from hourly pricing to a flat-rate monthly data plan of $19.95 [Lewis 1996].
One week later, Pacific Telesis Enterprises CEO M. Fitzpatrick made an apocalyptic
prediction [Marshall 1996]:
1An Internet Service Provider is defined as a company offering its customers subscriptions for wired and/or
wireless access to the Internet, e.g., AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon in the United States.
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My indicators point to a genuine data tsunami, a tidal wave, in the next 18
months. And, ladies and gentlemen, while we can surf the net, nobody can
surf a tidal wave.
Fortunately, that devastating tsunami did not come, but the tides of growth in the
demand for data did help the Internet grow.
However, today, the fear of a data tsunami is slowly coming back [Carew 2012].
The Cisco Visual Networking Index [Cisco Systems 2012a] predicted in May 2012 that
global IP (Internet Protocol) traffic will reach 1.3 zettabytes/year (1 zettabyte = 1021
bytes) and mobile data will reach 798 exabytes/year (1 exabyte = 1018 bytes) by the
end of 2016. With the growing popularity of iPhones, iPads, bandwidth-hungry appli-
cations, and cloud-based services, ISPs have been increasingly turning to pricing as the
ultimate congestion management tool to mitigate this growth –a feat often achieved by
imposing harsh overage penalties and “throttling” the very customers who drive this
demand.
The basic idea of congestion-based pricing has existed for several decades in many
different utility markets, e.g., transportation and electricity distribution networks. As
for the Internet, even as early as 1997, when it was just evolving into a commercial
service and its revenue models were hotly debated, MacKie-Mason et al. [1997] wrote:
We argue that a feedback signal in the form of a variable price for network
service is a workable tool to aid network operators in controlling Internet
traffic. We suggest that these prices should vary dynamically based on the
current utilization of network resources.
They were proposing a form of dynamic congestion pricing for the Internet. As a math-
ematically oriented research topic, congestion pricing has been extensively studied in
transportation networks, energy markets, telephone networks, ATM and IP networks,
etc. Thus, in some sense, there are not many new statements to be made about the
generic theory of congestion pricing. And yet, wireless and wireline data networks
have so far used the most rudimentary forms of congestion pricing, e.g., usage-based
charges. This can partly be explained by Clark’s [1997] observation:
Whatever the providers may prefer to do, competition may force some forms
of fixed-fee pricing in the marketplace.
While providers may have preferred flat rates in the 1990s, the situation is quite dif-
ferent now: the problem has worsened and operators are more aggressive in pursuing
new pricing schemes. The acceptance of this fact is perhaps nowhere more clearly ev-
ident than in the “New Rules for an Open Internet” [Genachowski 2010] announced
on December 21, 2010, by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chairman J.
Genachowski:
The rules also recognize that broadband providers need meaningful flexibil-
ity to manage their networks to deal with congestion.... And we recognize the
importance and value of business-model experimentation.
Therefore, the interesting question is: given the rapid rise in capacity demand in the
age of apps and clouds, how will pricing policies change over this decade?
The shift in pricing trends is more easily noticeable in growing economies, e.g., India
and Africa, where dynamic congestion pricing for voice calls is already practiced. The
next logical step in this pricing evolution is dynamic pricing for data. But pricing data
has several unique challenges (and opportunities), arising from both technological and
social considerations. A clear understanding of these issues requires consideration of
both the past and the present developments. To this end, this paper reviews some of
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the best-known pricing proposals of the last two decades and reports on some very
interesting pricing schemes that are in use today, along with the identification of re-
search challenges and emerging trends in access pricing.
1.1. Contributions
In 1996, Breker [1996] conducted a survey of computer network pricing schemes that
covered a few of the known protocols of the time. Similar reviews of pricing concepts for
broadband IP and integrated services networks were undertaken about a decade ago
by Falkner et al. [2000] and Chang and Petr [2001]. While these surveys mentioned
many concerns that exist even today–e.g., the need to manage network congestion–
since then, researchers have proposed several new schemes for pricing data, and some
variations of these plans have been adopted by wireless ISPs for their consumers.
Ezziane [2005] surveyed the charging and billing mechanisms used by 3G wireless
service providers. In particular, Ezziane reported on new approaches needed for me-
diation, billing, and charging for these services. More recently, Gizelis and Vergados
[2011] provided a detailed overview of the literature on pricing schemes for wireless
networks, while Sen et al. [2012b] studied pricing approaches that incentivize time-
shifting of demand. An annotated bibliography of several papers related to various
aspects of Internet economics, including pricing, was compiled by Klopfenstein [2009].
Our work not only complements these earlier surveys and reports on broadband pric-
ing, but also attempts to understand the kinds of pricing plans currently offered by
wired and wireless ISPs around the world, while noting some of the weaknesses in
their approaches. Additionally, we provide a detailed discussion on the various techno-
logical, socio-economic, and regulatory challenges to pricing innovation, and identify
several directions for future research. Our focus in this article is on the pricing for end-
user/consumer rather than the economics of peering or transit-fee agreements between
service providers. The key features of this work are summarized below:
— Identification of the threats to the Internet ecosystem from the perspective of ISPs,
consumers, and content providers.
—Detailed analysis of the various challenges to access pricing innovation and open
problems for future research.
—A broad overview of several past and recent proposals for pricing data, along with a
classification of static and dynamic pricing plans.
—Several illustrative examples of real pricing plans implemented by ISPs in different
parts of the world.
—An overview of the relationships between the ideas of broadband data pricing and
earlier congestion pricing ideas in road and electricity networks.
—Discussion on the other directions in access pricing innovation, including satellite
and heterogeneous networks.
Networking researchers and operators, caught in their conscientious efforts to find
the best solutions to this growing problem, often tend to overlook many of the inno-
vative practices already deployed by network operators in the real-world. However,
appraising the past several years of theoretical foundations on pricing and identify-
ing their varied realizations in the present world will likely be key to predicting future
trends and shaping an appropriate research agenda. The information presented in this
work draws from a wide range of sources, including research proposals, existing data
plans, news articles, consumer forums, and reports from experimental field trials.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of threats to the
Internet ecosystem from network congestion. An overview of the role of pricing in
achieving various network functionality goals, the fundamentals of network economics,
and the potential benefits of access pricing schemes in alleviating network congestion
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is provided in Section 3. Section 4 identifies the key challenges to overcome in order
to innovate access pricing and outlines directions for future research. A review of the
proposals and realizations of several static and dynamic pricing plans is provided in
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. The emerging trends in network pricing evolution and
their roles in satellite and heterogeneous networks are addressed in Section 7. Section
8 concludes with a summary of this work.
2. THREATS TO THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM
The Internet ecosystem today suffers from threats to both its sustainability and eco-
nomic viability. The sustainability concern is due to the near doubling of demand for
mobile data every year [Cisco Systems 2012a], which brings into question the feasi-
bility of finding any purely technical solutions to this problem. Additionally, changes
in the policy to make more spectrum available, although useful, is unlikely to provide
any long-term solution. For example, the US Government’s initiative in releasing an
additional 50 MHz of spectrum into the market for six carriers to compete for is widely
viewed as being quite insufficient [Sachson 2011].
The latter concern regarding the economic viability of Internet access is due to the
large overage charges and throttling that ISPs (e.g., AT&T and Verizon) are now im-
posing on their customers to penalize demand. To understand the implications of these
factors, we need to first look at the impact that this growth is having on the various
stakeholders of the Internet ecosystem before delving deeper into the promises that
Smart Data Pricing (SDP) holds [SDP 2012]. In the following discussion, we explore
the current challenges and threats from the perspective of carriers, consumers, and
content providers.
2.1. ISPs’ Traffic Growth
The Cisco Visual Networking Index [2012a] predicted in 2012 that mobile data traf-
fic2 will grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 78% between 2011 and
2016, reaching a volume of 10.8 exabytes per month in 2016. By that time, Cisco pre-
dicted that the average smartphone user will consume 2.6 GB per month, as opposed
to 150 MB/month in 2011 [2012b]. This growth in per-device data consumption is fu-
eled by the demand for bandwidth-intensive apps: for example, Allot Communications
reports that usage of Skype’s video calling service grew by 87% in 2010, while usage
of Facebook’s mobile app grew by 267% [Allot MobileTrends 2010]. Devices themselves
are also contributing to the increase in traffic volume; Apple’s iPad 3 quadrupled the
screen resolution from the iPad 2, allowing videos of higher quality to be streamed to
the device [Apple 2012].
Cisco predicted that by 2016, Wi-Fi and mobile data will comprise 61% of all In-
ternet traffic, with wired traffic comprising the remaining 39% [Cisco Systems 2012a].
Although the faster growth rate in mobile data traffic is a major concern, growing con-
gestion on wired networks both at the edge and in the networks’ middle mile also poses
a significant problem. By 2016, ISPs are expected to carry 18.1 petabytes per month
in managed IP traffic.3 That this growth is causing concern among ISPs can be seen
from Comcast’s recent initiative to cap their wired network users to 300 GB per month
[Comcast 2012]. Indeed, even in 2008 Comcast made headlines with their (since re-
versed) decision to throttle Netflix as a way to curb network congestion [Key 2010].
Video streaming due to services like Netflix is in fact a major contributor to wired
2“Mobile data traffic” includes handset-based data traffic, such as text messaging, multimedia messaging,
and handset video services, as well as traffic generated by notebook cards and mobile broadband gateways.
3Cisco’s definition of “managed IP” includes traffic from both corporate IP wide area networks and IP trans-
port of television and video-on-demand.
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network traffic–by 2016, Cisco predicts that fixed IPs will generate 40.5 petabytes of
Internet video per month [2012a].
Congestion in wired networks also affects rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), due
to the persistence of the middle-mile problem for RLECs. While the cost of middle mile
bandwidth has declined over the years due to an increase in the DSL demand needed to
fill the middle mile, the bandwidth requirements of home users have increased sharply
[Glass et al. 2012]. The FCC has set a broadband target rate of 4 Mbps downstream
speed for home users, but the average speed provided to rural customers is much lower.
The cost of middle mile upgrades to meet the target speeds will be substantial and
could be a barrier to providing greater speeds for subscribers and digital expansion
in the rural areas [Glass et al. 2012]. Therefore, research on access pricing to bring
down middle mile investment costs by reducing the peak capacity and RLECs’ over-
provisioning needs will be a crucial step in bridging the digital divide.
2.2. Consumers’ Cost Increase
With the growth in the volume of Internet traffic, ISPs have begun to pass some of
their network costs on to consumers. Consumers, on the other hand, have become in-
creasingly concerned at the high costs of Internet subscriptions. For instance, when
AT&T and Verizon announced in July 2012 that they were offering shared data plans
for all new consumers and discontinuing their old plans, many consumers ended up
with higher monthly bills [Chen 2012]. Users, in fact, are aware of these increasing
costs; while smartphone adoption is still growing in the United States, so is the popu-
larity of usage-tracking and data compression apps that help mobile users stay within
their monthly data caps and avoid overage fees (e.g., Onavo, WatchDogPro, DataWiz)
[Princeton EDGE Lab 2012]. And such trends are not exclusive to the U.S.; in South
Africa, for instance, consumers’ pricing plans for wired networks generally include
monthly data caps. To avoid overage charges, many use ISP-provided usage-tracking
tools [Chetty et al. 2012]. Even in the U.S., research on in-home Internet usage has
shown that many users are concerned about their wired Internet bills and would wel-
come applications for tracking their data usage and even controlling bandwidth rates
on in-home wired networks [Chetty et al. 2011]. In fact, while they are not as widely
known as similar mobile applications, some apps are offered for wired platforms that
allow users to do exactly that [Locktime Software 2012].
2.3. Content Providers’ Worries
As large U.S. ISPs like AT&T, Comcast, and Verizonmove to eliminate flat rate plans in
favor of tiered data plans with usage-based overage fees in both wired and wireless net-
works, these changes have triggered renewed debate on the Internet’s net-neutrality
and openness. These discussions have centered around who should pay the price of
congestion (i.e., content providers or consumers) and how such pricing schemes should
be implemented (i.e., time-of-day, app-based bundles, etc.). The major concerns in en-
abling such pricing practices arise from the possibility of paid prioritization of certain
content providers’ traffic, price discrimination across consumers, and promoting anti-
competitive behavior in bundled offerings of access plus content.
While such developments can indeed hurt the Internet ecosystem, one aspect that
should receive more attention from researchers is the threat to data usage even under
current data plans. With Internet users becoming more cautious about the increase in
their monthly bills [Teitell 2012], content providers are providing new options to down-
grade the quality of experience (QoE) for their users to help them save money. For ex-
ample, Netflix has started allowing “users to dial down the quality of streaming videos
to avoid hitting bandwidth caps” [Newman 2011]. Additionally, it is “giving its iPhone
customers the option of turning off cellular access to Netflix completely and instead rely
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on old-fashioned Wi-Fi to deliver their movies and TV shows” [Fitchard 2012]. Thus,
the ecosystem is being driven by an attitude of penalizing demand and lessening con-
sumption through content quality degradation.
Researchers have started to investigate these issues broadly along two lines of work:
opportunistic content caching, forwarding, and scheduling; and budget-aware online
video adaptation. Opportunistic content delivery involves the smart utilization of un-
used resources to deliver higher QoE; for example, to alleviate the high cost of bulk
data transfers, Marcon et al. [2012] proposed utilizing excess bandwidth (e.g., at times
of low network traffic) to transmit low-priority data. Since this data transmission
does not require additional investment from ISPs, they can offer this service at a dis-
count, relieving data transfer costs for clients. While utilizing excess bandwidth intro-
duces some technical issues (e.g., the potential for resource fluctuations), a prototype
implementation has shown that they are not insurmountable [Laoutaris et al. 2011].
Hosanagar et al. [2005] examined the pricing of caching in content delivery networks
(CDNs), finding that a profit-maximizing operator should offer two vertical classes of
service–premium, for which there is some charge, and a free best-effort traffic class.
Economic models have also been developed for altruistic cloud providers, i.e., those
whose main concern is to deliver high-quality service at low cost in response to user
queries, instead of maximizing profit [Dash et al. 2009]. Simulations of user queries
that mimic those for a scientific database showed that users are able to trade off cost
for faster response times.
In a similar spirit, recent works on online video adaptation systems, such as Quota
Aware Video Adaptation (QAVA), have focused on sustaining a user’s QoE over time
by predicting her usage behavior and leveraging the compressibility of videos to keep
the user within the available data quota or her monthly budget [Chen et al. 2012]. The
basic idea here is that the video quality can be degraded by non-noticeable amounts
from the beginning of a billing cycle based on the user’s predicted usage so as to avoid
a sudden drop in QoE due to throttling or overage penalties when the monthly quota
is exceeded. A common feature of these new research directions is that they address
the concerns of consumers and content providers by accounting for both technological
and economic factors.
3. PRICING DATA NETWORKS
In this section, we first discuss the role that access pricing in data networks can play in
achieving different functionality goals and in balancing trade-offs between conflicting
goals. We then provide a review of some fundamental concepts and terminology used
in the network economics literature to help readers understand the discussions on
different pricing proposals in the later sections of this paper. This is followed by an
overview of the important challenges and open questions in pricing research.
3.1. Network Features
Data networks provide connectivity among users and ubiquitous access to content,
which require them to meet a range of functionality goals such as efficiency, fairness,
reliability, manageability, complexity, and implementability. But these goals can often
conflict to various degrees. For example, the trade-off between fairness and efficiency
in allocating bandwidth to users sharing distinct subsets of links in a data network has
been addressed in recent works on multi-resource allocation [Joe-Wong et al. 2012b].
Pricing as a mechanism to enable a proportionally fair allocation of bandwidth among
network users has also received some attention [Yaı¨che et al. 2000; Kelly et al. 1998],
but more research is needed to understand how pricing can be used a mechanism
to achieve a desirable trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Similarly, efficiency,
fairness, and reliability goals can be hard to achieve simultaneously, although pricing-
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based solutions can play a role in balancing these requirements. For instance, Wagner
et al. [2012] developed a Nash Bargaining based congestion pricing mechanism in a
military network setting to distribute jobs across multiple computing clusters for fair
load-balancing while using redundancy in job replication to provide reliability. The
goals of manageability, complexity, and implementability can also conflict; measures
to make network traffic manageable usually introduce some system complexity and
implementation challenges. Auction-based resource allocation, such as a ‘Smart Mar-
ket’ [MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995], and congestion pricing for bandwidth allocation
[Murphy and Murphy 1994; Ha et al. 2012b] both improve efficiency and manageabil-
ity, but require additional client-side implementation and increase billing complexity
for the service provider. Pricing may also be used as a form of power control; Saraydar
et al. [2002] proposed a game-theoretic framework in which wireless users compete for
power so as to maximize their quality of service (QoS). In summary, various forms of
pricing have been proposed by researchers to attain some level of a trade-off between
one or more conflicting goals in data networks.
The role that pricing can play in networked systems is not just limited to the In-
ternet. Other utilities like electricity and transportation networks have used pricing
mechanisms over the years to regulate demand, such as varying off-peak and peak
hour prices or tolls for network access. But access pricing until recently remained
largely a topic of theoretical interest in the context of the Internet, and ISPs are only
now actively exploring pricing options to manage demand. In fact, several features of
data networks differentiate its pricing paradigm from that of other networks. First,
unlike traditional electricity grids which involve power generation and its delivery in
a point-to-multi-point manner, the Internet is much more decentralized and allows
for a bidirectional flow of traffic (i.e., uploads and downloads). As applications and
services that require bulk data transfer from the client to the cloud (e.g., machine-
to-machine communications, file backup, etc.) gain popularity, pricing can be used as
a signal for regulating not only the demand for content but also the inflow of con-
tent from the edge to the core of the network. Second, the ease of two-way commu-
nication between an ISP and its customers (due to well-designed user interfaces for
most network-enabled devices) creates the potential for pricing innovations that in-
volve real-time user reaction to feedback signals from the network. In contrast, most
household devices connected to the electricity network do not have usage monitor-
ing capabilities and have to be controlled and scheduled by a centralized controller,
as in smart grids [Joe-Wong et al. 2012a]. Third, pricing can exploit the time elastic-
ity of demand more efficiently in the case of Internet services, as many online appli-
cations (e.g., movie downloads, peer-to-peer traffic, software updates) are elastic and
can be completed without user intervention in small chunks whenever the prices are
low [Ha et al. 2012b]. Fourth, consumer billing, privacy, and security issues associated
with Internet access pricing, especially for mobile users, are much more complex and
sensitive than for electricity and transportation networks. Thus, while pricing can be
useful in improving the fairness, efficiency, and manageability of resources, network-
ing researchers also need to account for the additional complexity introduced by the
above considerations.
3.2. Network Economics Fundamentals
In this section, we introduce some of the microeconomic theory concepts
[Nicholson and Snyder 2008] commonly used in the broadband pricing literature. We
provide a simple example to illustrate several key ideas and terminology. Consider a
last-mile Internet service provider that wishes to build a single access link serving a
fixed customer base of N users. The ISP will charge each user based on the amount of
bandwidth reserved by that user on this shared access link. Thus, the ISP wishes to
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determine 1) the optimal capacity C needed for the access link, and 2) the usage-based
price p that should be charged for each unit of bandwidth reserved on this link.
In the traditional parlance of microeconomic theory, the ISP is a seller and the users
are buyers of a particular good (i.e., bandwidth). We first consider the individual user’s
perspective in illustrating the economic model. We index the users by the variable
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and denote the bandwidth reserved by user i as xi. Each user is
assumed to have a utility function Ui(xi, p) that represents the satisfaction that a user
receives from xi amount of bandwidth, after paying a rate p for unit bandwidth. Given
a price p per unit bandwidth, the user can choose the amount of bandwidth used (xi)
so as to maximize Ui(xi, p); we then obtain a function x
⋆
i
(p), which gives the user’s
optimal bandwidth usage as a function of the price. This function x⋆
i
(p) is then called
the user’s demand function. We sum the demand functions across all users to define the
aggregate demand function, D(p) =
∑N
i=1
x⋆
i
(p), which is the total bandwidth demand
as a function of the price. This utility optimization and a schematic demand function
D(p) are illustrated in the left side of Fig. 1.
Next, we consider the ISP’s perspective. We use c(x) to denote the cost of building
a link with total bandwidth capacity x. Given a price p and assuming full utilization
of the link, the ISP’s utility or profit function is then equal to Π(x, p) = px − c(x),
i.e., revenue px less the incurred cost. The ISP can then choose the capacity x⋆ of
the network so as to maximize its profit. Since this optimal capacity depends on the
price, we denote this function as S(p), i.e., the supply-side function. The ISP’s profit
optimization is illustrated on the right side of the diagram in Fig. 1. The individual
users and the ISP then interact in the marketplace to determine the capacity C of
the single-link network and the price p. In the center of Fig. 1, this interaction is
represented by showing the supply function S(p) and demand function D(p) on the
same axes. The equilibrium operating point then occurs when supply equals demand,
i.e., S(p) and D(p) intersect. At this price p⋆, each user will demand and receive her
utility-maximizing bandwidth usage, and the total bandwidth x⋆ = C available in the
network will be fully utilized. The social welfare,W , from this process is calculated by
summing up over the utilities of all users and the ISP, i.e.,W =
∑
i
Ui(x
⋆
i
, p⋆)+Π(x⋆
i
, p⋆).
3.3. Pricing as a Congestion Management Tool
The essential goal of smart data pricing is to incentivize users to adjust their behavior
so as to better allocate ISP resources among the users. Better resource management
in turn leads to a decrease in ISP cost and an increase in profit. Yet using pricing as a
congestion management tool requires ISPs to think carefully about users’ responses to
the prices offered. In particular, the question of timescale often arises when designing
pricing plans–should the prices change as network traffic volume changes? And if so,
how often and by what amount?
Static pricing changes prices on a relatively long timescale, e.g., months or years;
that is, the offered prices do not vary with the network congestion level. The popularity
of these plans arises from the certainty they provide regarding users’ monthly bills. For
instance, tiered data plans with pre-specified rates are prevalent in the United States
[Frakes 2010; Segall 2011], while usage-based pricing in which users are charged in
proportion to their usage volume is practiced by several European and Asian ISPs
[Parker 2010; Morgan 2011]. But even usage-based pricing leaves a timescale mis-
match: ISP revenue is based on monthly usage, but peak-hour congestion dominates
its cost structure (e.g., network provisioning costs increase with the peak-hour traf-
fic). Another well-known pricing plan is time-of-day (ToD) pricing, in which users are
charged higher prices for usage during certain “peak” hours of the day, in order to
relieve congestion at these times [Parris et al. 1992]. However, even with ToD pricing
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Fig. 1. Computation and interaction of user demand and ISP supply functions in the simplified marketplace
of a single access link.
the hours deemed as “peak” are fixed, which results in two challenges. First, traffic
peaks arise in different parts of the networks today, which may end up creating two
peaks during the day–one during peak periods, for traffic that cannot wait for several
hours for lower-price periods, and another peak during discounted “off-peak” periods
for time-insensitive traffic [The Economist 2009]. We discuss several of these existing
static pricing plans and proposals in greater detail in Section 5.
Dynamic pricing goes further than ToD pricing and does not pre-classify
peak and off-peak periods, instead adjusting prices at a finer timescale in re-
sponse to the network congestion level. For instance, in MacKie-Mason and Var-
ian’s auction-like “Smart Market” approach, users “bid” on packets, with the
bids reflecting their willingness to pay to send their packets through the net-
work at the given time; the gateway then admits packets with the highest bids
so as to maintain network efficiency and charges users according to the mini-
mum successful bid [MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995]. Congestion-dependent pric-
ing adapts the price charged in response to the observed congestion on the net-
work, with higher prices corresponding to higher congestion levels [Kelly et al. 1998;
Paschalidis and Tsitsikilis 1998]. However, prices that fluctuate depending on the cur-
rent network load may be inconvenient for users. Hence, another variant on dynamic
ToD pricing, known as the day-ahead pricing, has been proposed to guarantee the
prices a day in advance to give users some certainty about the future prices on of-
fer. Each day, new prices are computed for different times (e.g., hours) of the next day,
based on predicted congestion levels [Ha et al. 2012b; Joe-Wong et al. 2011]. A detailed
discussion on these dynamic pricing proposals will be provided in Section 6.
The above discussion raises several fundamental questions on the timescale of
broadband data pricing–should prices be based on real-time congestion? Should these
price computations be done online or offline for ensuring system scalability? While
real-time and other forms of dynamic pricing allow ISPs to quickly react to congestion
and manage their network resources, rapidly fluctuating prices may not be convenient
for consumers, requiring an automated system for submitting bids or reacting to price
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of selected pricing strategies and some related proposals.
changes on the client-side and a scalable monitoring and price computation system on
the ISP-side. These and other research challenges are discussed in the next section.
Figure 2 summarizes the pricing plans covered in this survey paper, including the
static and dynamic plans mentioned above. Before discussing the details of these plans,
however, we turn to the research challenges posed by broadband data pricing.
4. RESEARCH CHALLENGES IN ACCESS PRICING
For more than a decade, researchers have proposed several static and dynamic ac-
cess pricing plans for data networks (discussed in Sections 5 amd 6). While most of
these have remained as models of theoretical interest till 2010, the growing prob-
lem of network congestion has created the possibility for realizing new pricing mod-
els and schemes in practice. This evolving landscape of access pricing is driven by
moves from both wired and wireless ISPs to innovate their data plans as well as by
recognition from regulators of the need for such a policy change. Consequently, this re-
newed interest in pricing has ushered in a new wave of research on Smart Data Pricing
[SDP 2012], as evidenced by the growing number of conference tracks and workshops
dedicated to this topic [SDP 2012; WPIN 2012; NetEcon 2013]. But research in ac-
cess pricing is not just about revisiting old ideas, because the Internet ecosystem has
evolved rapidly over the last decade. In particular, pricing research today has to ac-
count for several factors that have emerged in recent times, such as: (a) the inherent
time elasticity of demand of several mobile applications, (b) growth in the traffic vol-
ume uploaded from the edge devices to the network core, (c) the need for better system
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scalability and privacy protection in a highly mobile environment, and (d) the ubiqui-
tousness of smart devices with improved graphical user interfaces that enable faster
reaction from consumers, thus paving the way to realize demand-response models and
other dynamic pricing schemes.
Another key difference is that in addition to appreciating the existing pricing
works, researchers need to account for both technological challenges as well as so-
cioeconomic factors which determine the eventual adoptability and implementabil-
ity of such pricing plans. Current research on Smart Data Pricing therefore focuses
on verifying the implementability and efficacy of the proposed models through con-
sumer surveys and field trials of the pricing solutions [Ha et al. 2012b; Sen et al. 2013;
Dyaberi et al. 2012]. Future research will likely see more such holistic and multi-
disciplinary undertakings between researchers and professionals from engineering,
network economics, information systems management, human-computer interaction,
marketing and industry [SDP 2012]. In the next section, we outline several design
challenges, open questions, and socioeconomic challenges that researchers need to ac-
count for in their work.
4.1. Technological Challenges
4.1.1. Price Computation. Determining the optimal price to charge for network access
requires developing economic models that account for the ISPs’ cost structure (i.e., the
trade-off between the cost of overprovisioning and the cost of network congestion) in
computing the prices that they are ready to offer and that their consumers are will-
ing to accept. In doing so, the model may require estimating users’ delay tolerance
for different traffic classes and their deferral patterns in response to offered prices.
The key challenges to this are choosing the correct form for utility functions, identify-
ing methods to profile usage behavior, and using these to estimate users’ price-delay
tradeoffs, all while keeping the model computationally tractable. Moreover, for scal-
ability reasons, the ISP may need to perform these estimations without monitoring
each individual household’s demand pattern so as to avoid additional complexity and
communication overhead [Joe-Wong et al. 2011].
Another consideration in price determination is the computation of price elasticity
of demand. This is of particular interest in the case of dynamic pricing, which re-
quires some implicit estimation of the users’ elasticity across different traffic classes.
However, the price a user is willing to pay for individual actions and the elasticity
of demand for individual applications is often hidden inside the “bundles” that users
purchase. Lastly, coupling dynamic pricing with dynamic QoS is another research area
that requires considerable exploration.
4.1.2. Communication with Users. The mechanism used to inform users about their us-
age and available prices also gives rise to several non-trivial research questions: (a)
finding ways for ISPs to communicate these information to the user, (b) helping users
understand the impact of their usage decisions on their data quota, (c) allowing dis-
tributed control of usage across multiple devices under a shared data plan, and (d)
understanding the dynamics of quota allocation among users, etc.
The first question on identifying suitable methods of communicating information to
end users depends largely on how the pricing scheme works; for example, in a very
dynamic pricing plan, usage decisions will need to be fully automated based on some
budget set by the user and auction mechanisms to determine how packets are pri-
oritized [MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995], while in less dynamic settings, it may be
sufficient to use an application interface for communication [Ha et al. 2012b]. For the
second question, developing usage prediction algorithms and integrating these in data
monitoring software applications [Princeton EDGE Lab 2012] can help users to bet-
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Fig. 3. Schematic of a feedback-control loop between users and ISPs.
ter understand the possible usage implications of their actions. As for the latter two
questions, researchers have only begun to investigate the full implications of pricing
[Sen et al. 2012a] and quota dynamics of the recently deployed shared data plans. In
particular, user trials to understand how pricing practices can affect usage behavior
and group dynamics among shared data plan users are some interesting directions for
future networking research.
4.1.3. Scalability and Functionality Separation. One of the design goals of pricing solutions
should be system scalability, which requires the identification and separation of client-
side and server-side functionalities. For example, dynamic pricing for data needs a
feedback-control loop between the ISP server, which computes the prices to offer to
users, and the users who respond to these prices [MacKie-Mason et al. 1997]. The ISP-
side functionality will typically consist of near real-time traffic monitoring, estimating
user delay tolerances for various traffic classes, and computing the prices to offer based
on aggregate traffic measurements. On the user side, functionalities like the ability to
view future prices and usage history can be provided by installing applications on
users’ mobile devices. Figure 3 provides a schematic showing the components of this
loop.
Ensuring pricing scalability also requires developing models and algorithms that al-
low ISPs to compute future prices based on aggregate congestion levels, rather than
monitoring each individual customer’s usage and response. Other open research ques-
tions involve the identification of mechanisms to manage shared data caps in a scalable
manner.
4.1.4. User Personalization. The personalization of pricing plans has recently received
some attention from ISPs, such as in app-based pricing and app bundles, discussed in
Section 5.10. The key challenge in dealing with user personalization of data plans is
that different users generate different traffic usage patterns by application, location,
and time. Consequently, identifying the factors on which such plans should be based
and measuring these plans’ efficiency need more investigation. Moreover, researchers
also need to address the issue of how to track and monetize app-based transaction
charges in case of such personalized plans.
In addition to the wide variation in app usage among different users, app-based pric-
ing faces significant technological challenges on its own. For instance, without deep
packet inspection software, ISPs may find it difficult to identify the traffic correspond-
ing to different apps. Different users, in fact, may at any given time be using different
versions of the same app, which can impact the network in different ways. Moreover,
some traffic may not be easily classified as belonging to specific apps, e.g., clicking on
hyperlinks in certain apps may open the link in an external web browser. Such “out-
of-app” traffic may confuse the user as to whether that traffic is counted as part of the
original app.
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4.1.5. Consumer Privacy and Security. The design of access pricing solutions should also
account for user privacy, particularly in terms of the feedback that ISPs record from
their users and the security of the data. For instance, if users transmit their usage
statistics or some measure of willingness to pay from client devices to ISP servers, then
this data exchange should take place over a secure connection. In order to view such
personal information, users might be required to sign into an account with their ISP
for authentication. Such privacy issues are particularly important for pricing plans
that involve per-flow pricing based on willingness to pay; these plans are highly cus-
tomized to each user and thus involve a substantial exchange of personal information.
A potential way to avoid privacy issues is to minimize the need to monitor individ-
ual users’ usage patterns, e.g., by offering uniform prices based on aggregate network
loads. Considering only aggregate usage data also helps to ensure scalability to an
ISP’s full customer base. For any form of dynamic pricing, however, researchers need
to address the security aspects of recording, storage, and transfer of information from
client devices to ISP servers.
4.1.6. Mobile Platform and Network Support. Innovating access pricing requires support
from software platforms on user devices and an ISP’s network infrastructure, particu-
larly for plans that aim to account for users’ response to offered prices. But creating a
feedback-control loop as shown in Fig. 3 requires developing functionalities for client-
side software. However, many widely used platforms (e.g., iOS, Android, and Windows)
have different levels of platform openness and can hinder the implementation of such
functionalities on the client device. The iOS platform for iPhones and iPads has several
restrictions: it strictly specifies what kind of applications can run in the background
and further prevents any access other than the standard application programming in-
terfaces (APIs). For example, obtaining an individual application’s usage and running
a pricing app in the background are prohibited. By contrast, the Android and Windows
platforms allow these features, e.g., introducing an API to report individual applica-
tions’ usage to third-party apps.
Wireless ISPs’ current billing systems (including 2G, 3G, and 4G) heavily depend
on the RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) protocol, which sup-
ports centralized Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) for users or
devices to use a network service [Rigney et al. 2000]. In particular, RADIUS account-
ing [Taylor 2000] is well suited to support usage-based pricing, since it can keep track
of the usage of individual sessions belonging to each user. Interim-update messages to
each session can be sent periodically to update the usage information. However, RA-
DIUS accounting lacks support for dynamic pricing plans, which require time-of-day
usage at various time scales (e.g., hourly, 30 mins or 10 mins).4 Consequently, several
protocols need to be extended to support these new pricing ideas.
Another interesting direction is to create an open API between user devices and an
ISP’s billing systems. The open API will foster innovations in pricing for both con-
sumers and providers. For example, the user devices connected to the ISP’s network
can easily fetch their pricing, billing, and usage information from the network, and
the ISP can also easily test and deploy new pricing schemes through the standard
interface.
4Note that interim update messages are sent periodically when a session joins the system, and hence, the
time interval for interim updates should be kept low to support sending time-of-day usage, which may
introduce significant control overhead.
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4.2. Socioeconomic Challenges
4.2.1. User Convenience. Consumers typically prefer the simplicity of flat rate pricing
plans [Odlyzko et al. 2012], and hence the possibility of inciting negative public reac-
tion is a serious concern for ISPs in experimenting with their data plans. But a combi-
nation of smart marketing and efforts to educate consumers has in the past overcome
such barriers. For similar reasons, consumers usually prefer a static over a dynamic
pricing plan because of the uncertainty associated with dynamic pricing. But this too
can be overcome if researchers find the right implementation for dynamic plans and
easy-to-use graphical user interfaces to communicate the price- and usage-related in-
formation. There are several precedents for dynamic pricing in other markets; for ex-
ample, electricity markets in the U.S. have implemented both real-time and day-ahead
pricing [U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012], which, with the proliferation
of smart meters, are proving to be successful business models. Similarly, in the case of
road networks, congestion pricing has been accepted by the public and legislators in
cities like Oslo and Rotterdam [Harsman 2001], where residents agree with the need
for tolls to decrease peak time traffic. Moreover, the ability to collect tolls with elec-
tronic road pricing has enabled even dynamic, congestion-dependent tolls. The suc-
cessful adoption of such pricing innovations in these markets indicates that similar
pricing ideas may be viable for data networks as well.
To innovate pricing plans for data networks, researchers have proposedmechanisms
that have different timescales of price adjustments. In Ha et al.’s work [2012b], the
prices vary in each hour but are computed and shown to users one day in advance
through an application that runs on their mobile devices (i.e., day-ahead pricing). In
contrast, MacKie-Mason and Varian [1995] proposed a “Smart Market” scheme that
requires real-time response, in which a dynamically varying per-packet price is im-
posed and users have to place “bids” on each packet to send them into the network.
Such an auction-based mechanism requires client-side software for fully-automated
user responses, improved QoS solutions, and upgrades in the ISP’s billing infrastruc-
ture. Researchers therefore need to study not only the impact of the time-scale of price
adjustments on user behavior and convenience, but also the design and implementa-
tion aspects of deploying new pricing plans.
4.2.2. User Budgets. Consumer trials have shown that mobile data customers exhibit
different “willingness to pay,” depending on the application under consideration. For
instance, Chen and Jana [2013] conducted a study in which participating users ex-
perienced four different speed tiers, each about twice the speed of the previous one.
Users were separated into two groups; they either received first higher and then lower,
or first lower and then higher, speeds. After these experiences, they were asked how
much they were willing to pay for each speed tier. Several users reported remarkably
similar willingness to pay for different speed tiers, partly because higher speed tiers
do not always result in observable gains across the whole range of applications due to
the inherent heterogeneity in apps’ bandwidth needs (e.g., streaming experience im-
proves with higher data speeds but browsing activities, like mailing, stock apps, are
less likely to noticeably improve). In fact, a separate trial [Chen and Jana 2013] asked
participants to use specific apps at the different speed tiers. Participants’ willingness
to pay for slower speeds dropped by a factor of more than two between low-bandwidth
stock apps and streaming YouTube videos. Thus, depending on the applications that a
person typically uses, his or her willingness to pay for different levels of service may
differ significantly from that of other users. In light of this ambiguity, Chen and Jana
propose a framework to allocate different speeds to different users, based on their will-
ingness to pay as negotiated through a second-price auction.
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Another determinant of users’ different willingnesses to pay for different speed
tiers of service is individual psychology. A recent study by Dyaberi et al.
[Dyaberi et al. 2012] offered users a probabilistic monetary incentive to stop using
data for 10 minute intervals throughout artificially designated “peak hours” of the
day. The authors found that psychological measures such as “agreeableness” (compas-
sionate vs. cold) and “openness” (curious vs. cautious) were correlated with users’ ac-
ceptance of incentives, while “neuroticism” (nervous vs. confident) was associated with
non-compliance.5 Interestingly, such psychological measures were found to be more
significant than the type of application in this study, perhaps due to the probabilistic
nature of the incentives offered. The authors did not, however, explore the resulting
gains in network efficiency from an ISP’s perspective, which is an interesting direction
for future study.
4.2.3. Ethical Concerns. Any pricing innovation will also need to overcome arguments
related to ethical issues; for example, consumer advocates have argued that dynamic
pricing schemes are unfair to low-income groups, as these users are unable to reduce
their usage in peak periods because they have very little usage to begin with. On the
other hand, proponents of pricing innovations have pointed out that flat-rate pricing
effectively forces the subsidization of heavy users by median and low bandwidth users,
and that dynamic pricing enhances users’ economic efficiency [Sen et al. 2012b]. This
is because dynamic pricing creates the option for all consumers to choose how much
they are willing to spend by deciding when and how much bandwidth they want to con-
sume [Ha et al. 2012b]. This view is shared by economists, who describe dynamic pric-
ing for the Internet as a natural extension of existing network control feedback mech-
anisms that bring “users back into the loop and thereby ensure that performance mea-
sures are user-oriented” [MacKie-Mason et al. 1997]. Recent studies in electricity mar-
kets have further strengthened this view by confirming that 80%-90% of low-income
households actually stand to gain from dynamic pricing of electricity [Faruqui 2010].
Networking researchers should aware of these ethical arguments regarding access
pricing in order to overcome policy hurdles.
4.3. Regulatory Challenges
Pricing in data networks has remained a politically charged issue, particularly for pric-
ing mechanisms that can potentially create incentives for price discrimination, non-
neutrality, and other anti-competitive behavior through app-based pricing or bundling
of access and content. Academics in law schools have already cautioned that the ongo-
ing debate on network neutrality in the U.S. often overlooks service providers’ need for
flexibility in exploring different pricing regimes [Yoo 2009]:
Restricting network providers’ ability to experiment with different protocols
may also reduce innovation by foreclosing applications and content that de-
pend on a different network architecture and by dampening the price signals
needed to stimulate investment in new applications and content.
But faced with the growing problem of network congestion, there has been a mon-
umental shift in the regulatory perspective in the US and other parts of the world.
This sentiment was highlighted in FCC Chairman J. Genachowski’s 1 December 2010
5The authors have three hypotheses related to psychological traits of consumers in their work. Agreeable-
ness hypothesis: Someone who is more agreeable will generally be more compliant with requests made of
them. Neuroticism hypothesis: Someone who is more likely to experience significant negative emotions will
be less likely to be compliant. Openness hypothesis: Someone curious about new possibilities will be more
willing to comply with a new possible mode of usage.
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statement [Schatz and Ante 2010], which recognizes “the importance of business inno-
vation to promote network investment and efficient use of networks, including measures
to match price to cost.”
5. STATIC PRICING
5.1. Fixed Flat-Rate Pricing
5.1.1. Monthly Rate. In the past, ISPs have charged users a flat monthly fee for broad-
band access, irrespective of the actual time spent on the network or data usage. Such
a simple pricing model was praised by Anania and Solomon [1997] and Odlyzko [2001]
based on historical and political precedence. A more theoretical argument was made
by Shakkotai et al. [2008], showing that simple flat-rate pricing is quite efficient in
extracting revenue for elastic traffic if all users run an identical application, but with
different valuations for the application.
There are several variations of the monthly flat-rate pricing model in the real world.
For example, “unlimited” data plans put no cap on the bandwidth used every month.
If a maximum usage limit is predetermined according to a flat price, the plan is called
“flat up to a cap.” Exceeding the limit usually incurs penalty costs that are proportional
to the usage above the cap, i.e., “metered” pricing. “Tiered” data plans with different
flat-rate pricing for different usage caps are often used to provide a range of choices to
consumers. Usually, users on flat-up-to-a-cap plans are shifted to usage-based pricing
or a higher-priced tier upon exceeding their data limit. But another emerging trend is
“flat to a cap, then throttle,” as offered by Orange Spain and Comcast [Sephton 2011b;
Comcast 2012].
Without such penalties, flat-rate plans will simply become unviable for ISPs. As if to
drive home that point, TelstraClear, New Zealand’s second largest telecommunications
provider, experimented with a free weekend plan during which they switched off their
usage metering and removed data caps from Friday evening to Sunday midnight of 2-5
December 2011. When all their data hungry customers simultaneously descended on
the net with whetted appetite for the big weekend buffet, many were dismayed to find
their speeds down to one-fifth of the usual [Keall 2011].
5.1.2. Hourly Rate. Some providers have begun offering flat-rate plans in which mo-
bile internet services are billed by the hour, i.e., the cap is specified in terms of time
instead of usage. For example, USB modem customers of the Egyptian mobile opera-
tor Mobinil can choose from packages of 30 hours for EGP 80/month or 60 hours for
EGP 125/month [Telecompaper 2010]. Time-based pricing has also been proposed for
road networks, in which users are charged based on how long it takes to travel from
one location to another [May and Milne 2000]. However, a London study showed that
time-based pricing encourages reckless driving by rewarding users who drive faster
[Richards et al. 1996].
Even in broadband networks, hourly and other flat-rate pricing plans have signif-
icant disadvantages. Although flat-rate billing is cheap to implement and operate,
encourages user demand, and creates simple and predictable monthly fees for cus-
tomers, it suffers from several disadvantages. First, flat-rate plans lead to inefficient
resource allocation and market segmentation, with low-usage customers typically sub-
sidizing the heavy users (i.e., the bandwidth hogs) [Hendershott 2006]. Second, while
ISP revenues depend on the median user, peak load costs are driven by the heavy
users, which creates a price-cost mismatch. In the Berkeley INDEX project, Varaiya
concurred with many of these disadvantages [1999]. Consequently, as the demand for
bandwidth grows, most ISPs are replacing their flat-rate plans with usage-based or
“metered” data plans.
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5.2. Usage-Based Pricing
New Zealand conducted an early experiment with usage-based pricing in 1989,
when six participating universities agreed to pay by the volume of traffic sent
in either direction through the NZGate gateway [Brownlee 1997]. Such a pricing
plan was necessitated by New Zealand’s geographically isolated location, expensive
trans-Pacific links, and the lack of subsidies from the New Zealand government
[McKnight and Bailey 1997]. This arrangement provided an early demonstration that
metering traffic and charging users by daily volume is feasible.
“Metered” pricing implies that a user is charged in proportion to his or her actual
volume of data usage [Walrand 2008; Li et al. 2009]. In practice, operators often use
“cap then metered” plans (also known as “usage-based” pricing), for which a user pays
a flat price up to a predetermined volume of traffic, beyond which the user is charged
in proportion to the volume of data consumed [Hande et al. 2010]. These variations on
usage-based pricing are the prevalent pricing plans in many countries, including the
U.S., U.K., Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong [Kang 2010; Parker 2010; Morgan 2011].
Similar pricing schemes have also been implemented for other networks. For
instance, analogous distance-traveled pricing, in which drivers are charged based
on the distance they travel, has been implemented for vehicle traffic in the U.S.
[Holguin-Veras et al. 2006], as well as for trucks in Switzerland, Austria, and Ger-
many [McKinnon 2006].
5.3. Paris Metro Pricing
Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) was proposed by Odlyzko [1999] as a simple and elegant
solution for creating differentiated service classes. PMP partitions the network re-
sources into several logical traffic classes, each of which is identical in its treatment of
data packets but charges users differently. Thus, users willing to pay more will select
the more expensive, and hence less congested, logical traffic class.
PMP is designed to enable maximum simplicity for the end-user in expressing
his/her preference through self-selection of the desired service level. But Odlyzko
also identified some potential problems in implementing PMP, such as finding ways
to set the prices and capacities of the logically separate channels, and to maintain
predictable performance on the different channels to avoid network instability. PMP
may also require better designs for the user interface to let users dynamically alter
their preferences and assign application sessions to different traffic classes. Recently,
Wahlmueller et al. [2012] proposed a more user-centric variant on PMP in which QoS
classes are replaced by QoE classes, with parameters such as bandwidth rate and
packet loss adjusted so that the user’s quality of experience remains at a specified level
for different types of applications (e.g., streaming requires higher bandwidth than web
browsing to achieve the same QoE). Users can also change their desired QoE, and the
corresponding price they are charged [Reichl 2010].
Despite the deployment challenges for broadband networks, PMP takes its name
from an actual pricing scheme on the Paris metro that was used until the 1980s to dif-
ferentiate first and second class coaches. A similar concept is used today in the U.S. for
roads with high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, which are identical to all other lanes
of the road, except that HOV lanes are restricted to vehicles with multiple passen-
gers [Poole and Orski 2003]. Drivers can self-select to use less congested HOV lanes
by paying the higher “price” of carpooling with other passengers.
5.4. Token Pricing
Lee et al. [2011] introduced a token pricing scheme in which users pay a fixed flat-rate
monthly fee for Internet access. Each user receives a certain number of “tokens” from
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the service provider, which offers two service classes of different qualities. The basic
quality class requires no tokens for access but may become congested. The higher qual-
ity class requires users to redeem some tokens, and hence has lesser congestion and
a better service because of a PMP-like effect. Thus, users self-prioritize their sessions
and implicitly pay for the higher QoS with their tokens for particularly urgent sessions
during peak network congestion. Each session, regardless of size, costs the same num-
ber of tokens, and users continually receive more tokens (e.g., one every ten minutes).
The benefits of such a system in reducing peak network congestion in a real network
have yet to be explored.
5.5. Priority Pricing
Cocchi et al. [1991; 1993] studied a pricing scheme in a multiple service network with
priority classes, but without any resource reservation. Users can request different QoS
by setting bits in their packets. A higher priority class charges a higher per-byte fee
but is assumed to receive better service from the network. Thus, users who pay a
greater per-byte fee for higher priority are in effect paying for the negative external-
ity imposed on traffic from other, lower priority users. The authors showed that such
quality-sensitive pricing is more efficient (in a Pareto sense) than flat pricing. However,
this result depends on the reservation-less assumption.
A game-theoretic framework was used to analyze static priority pricing by Marbach
[2004]. In his single-link model, users assign a priority class to their packets and are
charged accordingly. These charges are based on the packets submitted to the network
rather than their actual delivery. Marbach showed that there always exists a Wardrop
equilibrium bandwidth allocation, but it is not necessarily unique. This equilibrium
allocation and the associated link revenue do not depend on the prices of the different
priority classes, but the prices do have a simple relation with the packet loss probabil-
ity due to congestion in that class.
One disadvantage of priority pricing is users’ inability to express their desired levels
of delay and bandwidth share; priority pricing’s consistent preferential treatment of
higher priority classes might drive lower priority classes to little or no usage. Priority
pricing is largely absent today, but some ISPs are considering the idea of creating a
“priority data plan” in which users of the premium service are prioritized during peri-
ods of network congestion. Recently, SingTel of Singapore introduced such an option,
called “priority pass,” for its top-tier dongle customers [Kwang 2011].
5.6. Reservation-Based Pricing
Parris et al. [1992] were one of the first to study pricing in a reservation-oriented
network. They considered the issues of network utilization, ISP revenue, and blocking
probability under per-packet, setup, and peak-load pricing schemes. In their work,
users are characterized by their connection durations, budgets, and chosen classes of
service (with a higher per-byte fee for a higher priority service class). The network
decides to either accept or block the connection, depending on the sufficiency of the
user’s budget and the availability of network resources. Using simulations, the authors
show that for a given pricing scheme, price increases will at first increase and then
eventually decrease the net revenue, but will always decrease the blocking probability
and network utilization. Setup pricing decreases the blocking probability and increases
revenue for the ISP, and more generally performs better than per-packet pricing (in
that the blocking probability from admission control is lower under setup pricing than
per-packet pricing for the same level of revenue generated).
Despite these advantages, Parris et al.’s [1992] form of reservation pricing suffers
from some shortcomings. First, a flat-rate setup cost is unfair towards those users
with shorter conversations. Second, poorer users may not be able to afford a connec-
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tion under a high setup cost, thus leading to a greater digital divide. Third, average
network utilization is typically lower in the presence of setup costs, thus demonstrat-
ing a tradeoff between network efficiency and revenue maximization.
Parris and Ferrari [1992] presented another reservation pricing scheme for real-
time channel establishment. Under this plan, users are charged based on the type of
service requested, as measured by factors such as the bandwidth, buffer space, CPU
time resources reserved, and delay imposed on other users. The total charge a user
pays is a product of the type of service measure, channel duration, and a time-of-
day factor. However, the work does not provide any clear guidelines on how economic
considerations are to be mapped to a single time-of-day factor or the impact of the
overhead associated with estimating network parameters in real time.
In a later work, Delgrossi and Ferrari [1999] considered a pricing scheme based on
the portion of resource capacity used by a reserved data channel in a multiple-service
network. They introduced a charging formula with different reservation and transport
cost components for real-time and non-real-time traffic, along with a discussion on
computing resource capacity requirements for the channel as a function of the buffer
size, processing power, and schedulability.
5.7. Time-of-Day Pricing
Time-of-day or ToD pricing schemes charge peak and off-peak hours differently, so as
to disperse user demand more uniformly over time. Parris et al. [1992] and Parris
and Ferrari [1992] considered a form of ToD combined with reservation-based pricing,
which divides a day into peak and off-peak periods and incorporates the time elasticity
of user demand. They show that peak-load pricing reduces the peak utilization and
the blocking probability of all traffic classes, and increases revenue by inducing a more
even distribution of demand over peak and off-peak periods.
The most basic form of ToD in practice is a two-period plan that charges different
rates during the daytime and night time. For example, BSNL in India offers unlimited
night time (2-8 am) downloads on monthly data plans of Rs 500 ($10) and above. Other
variations of ToD pricing are offered elsewhere; for instance, the European operator
Orange has a “Dolphin Plan” for £15 ($23.50 USD) per month that allows unlimited
web access during a “happy hour” corresponding to users’ morning commute (8-9 am),
lunch break (12-1 pm), late afternoon break (4-5 pm), or late night (10-11 pm).
Time-of-day pricing has been implemented in road networks since the 1990s,
e.g., in California, Norway, and Sweden [Gomez-Ibanez and Small 1994]. The elec-
tricity market has also practiced static, ToD pricing for many years, a move
accelerated by power shortages over the past decade. Many academic works
on ToD pricing in these markets have also focused on constructing user de-
mand functions for ToD pricing by using data on electricity consumption, fo-
cusing on the case of two prices (peak and off-peak) [Faruqui and Wood 2008;
Hausmann et al. 1979]. Several works have reported on consumer trials of
time-of-day pricing [Charles River Associates 2005; Faruqui et al. 2009; Herter 2007;
Matsukawa 2001; I.B.M. 2007; Wells and Haas 2004; Wolak 2006]. Many of these tri-
als employed a variant on ToD, called critical peak pricing, in which the price on certain
days of especially high electricity consumption (e.g., very hot days during the summer)
was increased beyond the normal peak price. Such pricing was generally judged to be
successful in lowering peak electricity consumption, especially on days of high demand.
5.8. Expected Capacity Pricing
In 1997, Clark [1997] wrote
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In the future it will be desirable to provide additional explicit mechanisms to
allow users to specify different service needs, with the presumption that they
will be differentially priced.
He proposed expected capacity pricing as a mechanism to allow users to explicitly spec-
ify their service expectation (e.g., file transfer time), while accounting for differences
in applications’ data volume and delay tolerance. The idea is that by entering into pro-
file contracts for expected capacity with the operator, different users should receive
different shares of network resources only at times of congestion [Songhurst 1999].
One specific proposal to realize this service involved traffic flagging (i.e., each packet
is marked as being in or out of the user’s purchased profile, irrespective of network
congestion level) by a traffic meter at access points where the user’s traffic enters
the network. This is followed by congestion management at the switches and routers
where packets marked as out are preferentially dropped during congested periods, but
are treated in an equal best-effort manner at all other times. The expected capacity
is thus not a capacity guarantee from the network to the user, but rather a notion of
the capacity that a user expects to be available and a set of mechanisms that allow
him or her to obtain a different share of the resource at congested times. This pricing
can be simply enforced at the router and switches of the network, and allows service
providers to have more stable estimates of the future necessary capacity based on the
total expected capacity sold, rather than the sum of peak rates of all users’ access
links. A dynamic pricing version of the scheme has also been explored [Clark 1997].
However, in order to implement this pricing scheme, the assignment of price values to
expected capacity profiles requires further study.
5.9. Cumulus Pricing
Cumulus pricing schemes consist of three stages: specification, monitoring, and nego-
tiation. A service provider initially offers a flat-rate contract to the user for a specified
period based on the user’s estimate of resource requirements. During this time the
provider monitors the user’s actual usage and provides periodic feedback to the user
(by reporting on “cumulus points” accumulated from their usage) to indicate whether
the user has exceeded the specified resource requirements. Once the cumulative score
of a user exceeds a predefined threshold, the contract is renegotiated. Hayel and Tuf-
fin [2005] studied such a scheme and used simulated annealing to optimize the total
network revenue in terms of the renegotiation threshold.
Cumulus pricing is a simple pricing scheme that can be easily implemented at the
network edge. Some ISPs have been experimenting with similar ideas. For example,
Vodafone in the U.K. announced a new “data test drive” plan that allows customers
joining any of the monthly pay contracts to have unlimited data access (including teth-
ering, but excluding roaming) for the first three months. The data usage report is then
fed back to the user to negotiate whether his or her chosen plan is appropriate. The
user can choose to either continue with the existing plan, possibly incurring overage
charges, or to switch to an alternative plan suggested by Vodafone [Sephton 2011c].
5.10. Application- and Content-Based Pricing
Several mobile service providers have been experimenting with various forms
of application- or content-based pricing. These are somewhat analogous to cer-
tain types of tolls in road networks, in which drivers are charged different
rates for different types of vehicles (e.g., trucks are charged at a higher rate)
[U.S. Office of Highway Policy Information 2011]. Indeed, charging by vehicle type was
mentioned as a criterion for efficient road pricing in a report by the U.K. Ministry of
Transportation [May 1992].
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Fig. 4. Comparison of static pricing schemes (Section 5).
While the currently available app-based data plans are mostly designed to attract
and “lock in” customers by bundling content and data plans, they highlight an emerg-
ing trend of operators experimenting with pricing structures that charge (or subsi-
dize) differently based on application type [Ericsson 2011; Higginbotham 2010]. These
types of bundled services, which generally offer bundled access to music or movie
streaming, are offered by Three in the U.K., Telus in Canada, and TDC in Denmark
[Sephton 2011a; Vardy 2011]. Orange UK allows users to choose which media services
to bundle [Owoseje 2011].
Another form of app-based pricing that is becoming increasingly popular is “spon-
sored content,” in which operators subsidize certain types of data. For instance, Mobis-
tar in Belgium offers “zero-rated” or free access to Facebook and Twitter [Bubley 2011].
Japan’s Softbank Mobile is also moving in this direction, having contracted with Er-
icsson to develop the infrastructure for app-based and other types of innovative data
plans [Ericsson 2010]. While technological advances such as Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) have allowed ISPs to differentiate between the traffic of some apps and offer
these sponsored content plans, app-based pricing still faces several challenges. As dis-
cussed in Section 3, these challenges will likely limit the deployment of app-based
pricing at the present time.
Figure 4 compares the various static pricing schemes discussed in this section in terms
of their key features, deployment status, and both technological and socioeconomic
challenges. While different forms of usage-based pricing are currently the norm in
most parts of the world, some operators have begun to introduce more innovative data
plans, such as priority- or app-based pricing.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of dynamic pricing schemes (Section 6).
6. DYNAMIC PRICING
In this section, we discuss pricing models in which the prices offered vary over time,
e.g., due to fluctuating network congestion levels. While such models often allow “bet-
ter” network management by providing the ISP with more pricing flexibility, they also
suffer from significant barriers to user adoption, as discussed in Section 4. A summary
and comparison of the pricing plans discussed may be found in Fig. 5.
6.1. Raffle-Based Pricing
Like ToD pricing, raffle-based pricing divides the day into peak and off-peak periods.
Users are then offered probabilistic incentives to shift their demand to off-peak peri-
ods, in the form of a raffle or lottery for a given monetary reward. The probability of
winning the lottery is proportional to the user’s contribution to the reduction in peak
demand. This all-or-nothing lottery may instead be replaced by one in which the ISP
divides the total reward by the total amount of traffic shifted, paying this amount to
each user with a probability equal to the percentage of usage shifted to the off-peak
period. Loiseau et al. [2011] derived expressions for the Nash equilibrium of this user-
ISP interaction and show that in some cases the social welfare is more robust to price
variations than a comparable time-of-day pricing plan with two periods. Yet the un-
certainty inherent in raffle-based pricing may reduce its effectiveness; users may not
shift their usage to off-peak periods without guaranteed rewards. Indeed, the reward
amount depends on other users’ behavior. A field trial of such a policy would therefore
be necessary to understand its effectiveness.
A recent trial by Dyaberi et al. [2012] employed a similar probabilistic incentive
mechanism, offering (with some probability) rewards to users for terminating their
cellular usage during a 10-minute interval. Though the authors observed an 83% ac-
ceptance rate, their trial participants were largely university students, and the devices
used were loaned for the purposes of the trial. Thus, their results may not extend to
the general population.
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6.2. Dynamic Priority Pricing
Gupta et al. [1997] presented a dynamic priority pricingmechanism in which the prices
serve as a congestion toll for network access. The authors modeled user service re-
quests as a stochastic process and network nodes as priority queues. A user’s incoming
request has an instantaneous value for the service and a linear rate of decay for this
value to capture the delay cost. Users’ requests can be fulfilled using different alterna-
tives, each with its corresponding price and waiting time. The user trades off between
the total cost of service and the cost of delay to choose an optimal alternative in a par-
ticular priority class. The principal benefit of such a scheme is that it achieves resource
allocation in real time in a completely decentralized manner; moreover, users’ myopic
decisions lead to socially optimal choices.
Dynamic priority pricing is based on general equilibrium theory, which generalizes
the notion of an “equilibrium” to several interacting markets, in this case the mar-
ket situation at any particular point in time (i.e., supply equals demand at any given
time). However, since computing general Arrow-Debreu equilibria in the volatile envi-
ronment of the Internet is expensive, the authors introduced the notion of a stochastic
equilibrium and derive optimal prices that support the unique stochastic equilibrium.
They also developed a decentralized real-time mechanism to compute near-optimal
prices for the stochastic equilibrium: the cost of service (i.e., the price) is updated after
each time period by taking a weighted average of the price in the previous period and
the new optimal price, calculated from updated estimates of the waiting times for dif-
ferent priority classes. The convergence properties of this dynamic pricing mechanism
were demonstrated with simulations that allowed the system to adapt to changing
loads on the network. However, implementing dynamic priority pricing will require
modifications to network topology management applications, databases, accounting
systems, and the end-user interface.
6.3. Proportional Fairness Pricing
Kelly et al. [1998] proposed proportional fairness pricing as a means to allocate re-
sources (which determine user rates) in proportion to the user’s willingness to pay. The
global optimization of maximizing net utility across all users, given resource capacity
constraints, can be decomposed into a user and a network optimization problem. Kelly
showed that there exist a price vector and a rate vector that optimize both the user
and the network’s optimization problems. Alternatively, if each user chooses a price
per unit time according to his or her willingness to pay, and if the network allocates
rates per unit price that are proportionally fair, then a system optimum is achieved
when users’ choices of prices and the network’s rate allocation are in equilibrium.
Courcoubetis et al. [1998] extended this idea by replacing end-users with intelligent
agents that can decide the willingness to pay on behalf of the user while maximizing
the user’s utility. However, this element introduces overhead in installing such agents
on the users’ devices or machines and adding network servers to compute the optimal
rate allocation vectors at a short timescale.
6.4. Effective Bandwidth Pricing
Kelly’s effective bandwidth pricing [1994] is a variant on usage-based pricing in which
users are charged based on self-reported peak and mean traffic rates, as well as the
observed mean rate and duration of each connection. Before a user’s connection is
accepted, the user is required to provide mean and peak rates for the connection. Given
a formula describing effective bandwidth as a function of the peak and mean rates, the
user is charged a tariff given by the tangent line to this effective bandwidth formula (as
a function of the mean rate) at the self-reported mean and peak rates. Evaluating this
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the tariff charged in effective bandwidth pricing.
tariff at the observed mean rate, the result is multiplied by the connection duration
to give the total charge to the user. Figure 6 shows a schematic illustration of such a
tariff.
Kelly showed that under this pricing scheme, users minimize their expected cost by
accurately reporting the connection’s mean and peak rates. Thus, the final charge to
the user consists of a term proportional to the connection duration and another term
proportional to the connection volume. Users may renegotiate the tariff for a flat fee,
e.g., for highly variable traffic.
This pricing scheme can also be extended to connection acceptance control–a connec-
tion is accepted if the network’s effective load, as calculated from the tariffs charged to
existing connections, falls below a certain threshold value. While effective bandwidth
pricing is compatible with user incentives and fairly simple, it does require an explicit
effective bandwidth formula, and it requires users to know, or at least estimate, the
peak and mean rates of each connection. Moreover, further validation is needed to un-
derstand whether the benefits of this pricing scheme justify the accounting overhead
associated with charging each connection based on its duration and volume.
6.5. Responsive Pricing
MacKie-Mason et al. [1997] described the concept for responsive pricing in the follow-
ing words:
By associating a cost measure with network loading, all users can be signaled
with the prices necessary to recover the cost of the current network load. Price-
sensitive users–those willing and able to respond to dynamic prices–increase
economic efficiency by choosing whether or not to input traffic according to
their individual willingness to pay the current price.
In other words, a user’s price sensitivity and time sensitivity for different applications
can be exploited by networks to dynamically set prices to alleviate congestion. This
process broadly encompasses the philosophy behind different forms of dynamic time-
dependent pricing. In the case of the Internet, MacKie-Mason et al. [1997] argued that
such a responsive pricing system is required for network efficiency.
The network can set response prices either in a closed-loop feedback
[Murphy et al. 1994; Murphy and Murphy 1994] or a “Smart Market” approach
[MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995]. In a closed-loop setting, the network state, mea-
sured in terms of the buffer occupancy at the gateway, is converted to a price per packet
for users’ adaptive applications, which then decide how much data to transmit. This
closed-loop feedback is thus similar to Gupta et al.’s priority pricing [1997], discussed
in Section 6.2: the basic idea is that dynamic prices are set so as to incentivize users
to behave in a way that enhances network efficiency. However, due to the adaptive na-
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ture of the prices, there is a slight delay in the feedback loop: prices are set based on
network conditions in the previous time period.6
This delay in the feedback loop is tightened in the Smart Market approach proposed
byMacKie-Mason and Varian [1995]. In this approach, each user places a “bid” on each
packet that reflects their willingness to pay to send the packet onto the network at a
given time. The gateway admits packets in the descending order of their bids as long
as the network performance remains above a desired threshold. Users are charged
according to the minimum bid on a packet admitted into the network at the time, and
thus pay only for the congestion cost at the market clearing price. While such auction
schemes encourage network and economic efficiency, they require substantial changes
in users’ application interfaces and providers’ billing systems, with additional concerns
in the case of billing contention, etc. Moreover, as discussed by Sarkar [1997], such
a pricing scheme would require extensive coordination among different nodes of the
network, and is open to abuse by those controlling bottleneck facilities. Sarkar argued
that these concerns may be overcome with appropriate governmental regulation.
6.6. Dynamic Congestion Pricing
Dynamic congestion pricing is a particular realization of the idea of responsive pricing,
in which the network announces prices based on current congestion levels and the
user response to these prices is fed back into the control loop to compute new prices.
Ganesh et al. [2001] used congestion prices as a mechanism to provide both feedback
and incentives to end-systems for rate adaptation in a decentralized manner; they
then studied the resulting dynamics. Paschalidis and Tsitsikilis [1998] addressed the
issue of revenue and welfare maximization for dynamic congestion pricing of customer
calls by using a dynamic programming formulation. In their model, users initiate calls
that differ in their service class, resource requirements, and call duration. Based on
the current congestion level, the service provider charges a fee per call, which in turn
influences users’ demand. Their findings additionally corroborate the usefulness of
time-of-day pricing in reducing network congestion problems.
Congestion-based pricing innovations have been adopted in many markets outside
of the U.S. In recent years, network operators in highly competitive and lucrative
markets, such as those in India and Africa, have adopted innovative congestion- and
location-dependent dynamic pricing for voice calls [The Economist 2009; Sen 2011], al-
though not yet for mobile data plans. An analogous congestion-based scheme for trans-
portation networks, in which users are charged baed on both their distance traveled
and time to travel that distance, was considered in Cambridge, U.K., but was never
fully implemented [Gomez-Ibanez and Small 1994].
Congestion pricing in wireless cellular networks has also received some attention
in the literature, e.g., a survey by Al-Manthari et al. [2011], which divides pricing
polices into two categories: admission-level and power-level pricing. The authors men-
tioned several challenges specific to wireless networks, e.g., interference, user mobility,
and bandwidth limits, and surveyed proposed pricing policies that incorporate priority
queues and QoS support.
Several works on pricing in the electricity market have adopted a congestion-
based dynamic pricing model, as reviewed by Borenstein et al. [2002] and pro-
posed in a more recent paper by Samadi et al. [2010]. Many of these fo-
cus on end user management of congestion-dependent prices, proposing al-
gorithms to predict future prices and schedule energy usage accordingly
6Similar ideas have also been adopted in the electricity industry; for instance, Vytelingum et al. [2010]
developed an auction scheme that takes into account varying market capacity, with dynamic offers from
electricity distributors and real-time responses from users (i.e., households) buying electricity.
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[Du and Lu 2011; Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia 2010; Mohsenian-Rad et al. 2010].
Other works have attempted to combine these two perspectives by examining a feed-
back loop between the user and provider [Roozbehani et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011].
6.7. Day-Ahead Pricing
Day-ahead pricing is a variant on dynamic congestion pricing in which prices vary by
the time of the day (e.g., each hour) and users are told the future prices one day in
advance. Joe-Wong et al. [2011] proposed an algorithm for calculating these day-ahead
prices that models a user’s willingness to shift different types of usage to lower-price
times. The model accounts for the fact that some types of traffic, e.g., email, are more
delay-sensitive, while for other traffic, e.g., software updates, users may be willing to
wait several hours for a lower price. As prices are offered throughout the day, the ISP
monitors the change in traffic volume relative to a baseline traffic trace with constant
prices. These changes are then used to optimize the prices over the next day, in a
feedback loop structure similar to that proposed by MacKie-Mason et al. [1997].
A recent pilot trial in the U.S. has demonstrated the feasibility, benefits, and ar-
chitecture of day-ahead pricing for mobile data. In this trial, Ha et al. [2012b] imple-
mented a form of day-ahead pricing for a small number of iOS users and reported that
such pricing policies can in fact reduce the peak load on the network. While this form
of dynamic pricing less accurately reflects the real-time network congestion, it has the
advantage of increasing user certainty by guaranteeing some prices in advance and al-
lowing users to plan ahead. In fact, Ha et al.’s trial included an automated scheduling
algorithm on user devices that can schedule usage based on future prices so as to save
users’ money [2012b]. A similar day-ahead pricing scheme has also been proposed for
electricity smart grids [Joe-Wong et al. 2012a].
6.8. Game-Theoretic Pricing
Several authors have used game-theoretic models for pricing data, some of which are
briefly discussed here. Hayer [1993] proposed transport auctions as a way to distribute
excess capacity across users with delay tolerant traffic. A decentralized auction-based
approach to the pricing of edge-allocated bandwidth, called “market pricing,” was ex-
plored by Semret et al. [2000] in a differentiated services Internet.
Yaı¨che et al. [2000] introduced a cooperative game-theory framework that used Nash
bargaining (i.e., a competition model whose solution satisfies certain fairness axioms
such as Pareto-optimality7 [Nash 1950]) to compute bandwidth allocations for elastic
services and pricing in broadband networks. This framework provides rate allocations
for users that are not only Pareto-optimal from the viewpoint of the whole system, but
also consistent with game-theoretic fairness axioms.
Other researchers have used game-theoretic formulations to investigate the effect of
pricing on user adoption and fair use. Pricing models to induce participation and col-
laboration in a public wireless mesh network were studied by Lam et al. [2007]. Shen
and Basar [2007] investigated optimal nonlinear pricing policy design as a means of
controlling network usage and generating profits for a monopolistic service provider.
Dynamic game models have also been used to determine WiFi access point pricing by
Musacchio and Walrand [2006], which is relevant in the context of congestion manage-
ment through WiFi offloading.
Jiang et al. [2008] introduced a model to study the role of time preferences in net-
work pricing. In their model, each user chooses his or her access time based on his
or her preference, the congestion level, and the price charged. The authors show that
7A Pareto-optimal allocation of resources is one for which increasing any one user’s allocation will decrease
another user’s allocation.
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Table I. List of key example pricing plans discussed.
Pricing Practice Example Pricing Plan (see the paper for details)
Type Category Description Network Country
Static
Fixed Flat-Rate
Monthly fee;
Both
Vanishing
unlimited worldwide
Monthly;
Wired
U.S. (AT&T,
flat to a cap, Verizon)
then usage-based
Monthly;
Wired/wireless
Spain (Orange)
flat to a cap,
U.S. (Comcast)
then throttle
Monthly; shared Wired/wireless
Canada (Rogers)
U.S. (AT&T,
Verizon)
Hourly rate Wireless Egypt (Mobinil)
Usage-Based Cap then metered Wired/wireless
Worldwide
(e.g. U.S., U.K.)
Priority Pricing
Priority pass
Wireless
Singapore
(for dongle users) (SingTel)
Time-of-Day
Day-time &
Wireless India (BSNL)
night-time rates
Users choose
Wireless U.K. (Orange)
happy hours
Cumulus Pricing
Usage-based
Wireless U.K. (Vodafone)contract
negotiation
App-Based Pricing
Free access to
Wireless
U.K. (Orange)
select apps; Denmark (TDC)
bundling
Dynamic Congestion-Based
Hourly price
Wireless (voice calls) Uganda (MTN)
changes
Location and
Wireless (voice calls) India (Uninor)
cell-load based
Time- and
Wireless (data) U.S. (pilot trial)
usage-based
maximization of both the social welfare and the revenue of a service provider is feasi-
ble if the provider can differentiate its prices over different users and times. However,
if the prices can only be differentiated over the access times and not across users due
to insufficient information, the resulting social welfare can be much less than the op-
timum, especially in the presence of many low-utility users. Caron and Kesidis [2010]
took a similar approach for the electricity market; in their model, users schedule their
energy usage in a cooperative game so as to minimize the total load on the network.
Despite these theoretical works, game-theoretic models have found little traction
among real network operators so far, perhaps due to the stylized nature of the theo-
retical models and the challenges in estimating user utility and system parameters in
the real world.
The different real-world examples of various static and dynamic pricing plans for the
wired and wireless services discussed in this paper are summarized in Table I.
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Table II. Satellite plan features and congestion control mechanisms.
Feature Options
Data caps (limits)
Monthly [Muller 2012]
Daily
Uplink and downlink speeds Varies by company [D’Orazio 2012; IPNet JSC 2012]
Overage penalty
Throttling to lower speeds [D’Orazio 2012]
Usage-based charges [IPNet JSC 2012; Rural Broadband 2012]
7. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
The recent exponential growth in data demand has catalyzed major changes within
broadband pricing research and practice. In this section, we discuss the new directions
that are emerging from these recent changes.
7.1. Satellite Broadband
This survey focuses mainly on wired and wireless pricing, as these are the mediums
most impacted by users’ increasing demands for data. Recently, however, many compa-
nies have begun to offer satellite broadband as an alternative to wired or wireless In-
ternet access. While satellite broadband solutions have existed for over twenty years,
satellite Internet access has only recently become a popular offering for end users.
Satellite is becoming especially prevalent as a way to reach users in rural and sparsely
populated regions, such as in Africa, where installing more traditional wired or wire-
less infrastructures is not cost-effective [Svitak 2012].
Since satellite broadband has not yet experienced serious congestion problems, its
pricing plans remain fairly simple, though the growth in demand for high-bandwidth
services may open up possibilities for new pricing schemes in the future. Technological
capabilities that allow for fine granular capacity provisioning and dynamic channel
allocation will also facilitate the adoption of more innovative pricing practices. Sun and
Modiano [2006] proposed a pricing-based solution to the problem of channel allocation
in slotted Aloha-based satellite networks. Today, satellite broadband consumersmostly
pay in proportion to the uplink and downlink data rates by subscribing to a chosen tier
of available data plans. Each tier has specified maximum upload and download speeds
and a monthly cap on bandwidth. Beyond this cap, a user’s speed is either throttled
down or charged by overage, depending on the plan. Table II gives an overview of key
features of different plans, which vary by the granularity of data caps, the offered
uplink and downlink speeds, and the type of overage penalties.
7.2. Pricing of Heterogeneous Networks
As demand for mobile data grows, ISPs are not only introducing new pricing plans
but are also encouraging users to offload their traffic onto other wireless networks. For
instance, AT&T deployedWiFi hotspots in New York and San Francisco after their cel-
lular networks proved unable to handle the demand for data in such congested urban
areas [Ricker 2010]. Also in the United States, Verizon has stated that it expects to run
out of LTE spectrum as soon as 2013 in somemarkets; the company is encouraging con-
sumer adoption of femtocells to supplement this limited capacity [Electronista 2012].
ISPs’ key reasons for rolling out small cells are that they help increase capacity supply
while keeping costs low and rely on end-user backhauling for data transfers. Moreover,
higher band spectrum is now becoming available, which is suitable for small cells, in
particular femtocells. Although small cells are cheap to deploy and work as plug-and-
play devices, they can often lead to poor performance due to interference on the shared
spectrum, which poses considerable technical challenge. With the increasing adoption
of small cells and their co-existence with other wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G), ISPs
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will soon need to consider the pricing of heterogeneous networks with devices being
able to connect to either of the available network technologies.
As with all pricing, heterogeneous network pricing can be used to steer users to an
optimal allocation of resources that maximizes the efficiency of the networks consid-
ered. For instance, Neely et al. [2005] examined flow control in a heterogeneous net-
work setting with wired and wireless services. They employedmethods from stochastic
optimal control to optimize user utility subject to the bandwidth capacity constraints,
an approach that may be interpreted as a type of dynamic market pricing. Chan et al.
[2005] assumed that users have access to multiple networks, possibly more than two,
and used dynamic pricing to steer users to the “optimal” network so as to maximize
overall user utility.
Other, more recent works on heterogeneous networks have emphasized the profit
and revenue of Internet service providers, rather than employing prices solely to op-
timize resource management. These works often begin by modeling user adoption of
heterogeneous technologies as a function of the access prices; users are assumed to
adopt different technologies so as to maximize their utility, which in turn depends on
the total number of users adopting each technology (e.g., due to positive externalities
of connectivity, or negative externalities from network congestion). Shetty et al. [2009]
used such amodel to study revenuemaximization for femtocells, while Ren et al. [2013]
examined the selection of femtocell spectrum-sharing schemes and the corresponding
optimal prices. Joe-Wong et al. [2013] took a more generic approach, studying the adop-
tion of generic “base” and “supplemental” technologies and the ISP’s profit-maximizing
prices when offloading benefits and network deployment costs are considered. A game-
theoretic formulation that does not include adoption modeling was proposed by Niyato
and Hossain [2008], in which two companies competing for end users were assumed to
offer WiFi and WIMAX connectivity.
7.3. New Pricing Architectures
Academics have often argued that architectural issues in Internet pricing are more
important than the form or basis of the actual prices charged: for instance, Shenker
et al. [1996] opined that the flat- versus usage-based pricing debate oversimplifies the
issue, as in reality there is a continuum between the two. The authors made the case
that research into Internet pricing has overly focused on optimality, and in particular
on matching prices to the marginal congestion costs. Instead, they advocated an ar-
chitectural focus, i.e., designing the network architecture to facilitate various pricing
plans, such as allowing receivers rather than senders to be charged for usage. Architec-
ture and systems enabling such pricing innovations for broadband data are arguably
becoming an active area of research, and are central to shaping the future research
agenda. Understanding these interactions between economics and technology in order
to create the overall design of future networks has been identified as a priority in the
NSF’s Future Internet Design initiative [Fisher 2007].
As new pricing plans are introduced, ISPs must confront the challenges of ensuring
that they are acceptable to users, while also maintaining system scalability, privacy,
and security. One way to do this, e.g., as proposed by MacKie-Mason et al. [1997], is
to add a client-side component to the current pricing architecture, as shown in Fig.
7. The client-side component includes modules to show users their data consumption
and spending over the month, thus allowing users to monitor and control their spend-
ing, even if they are unfamiliar with their data plan specifics. Secure connections with
the ISP server ensure that user privacy is not compromised. In fact, data monitor-
ing apps that sit exclusively on the client side are already being offered on both wire-
less and wired platforms [Princeton EDGE Lab 2012; Locktime Software 2012] to help
users manage monthly data caps. On wired desktop platforms, users can even control
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Fig. 7. Pricing architecture with client- and server-side components.
Table III. Summary of some emerging trends.
Trend Description Reference
Flat-rate & usage- Coexistence of both types of plans.
based pricing Emergence of shared data plans. [Buckley 2012; Fried 2011]
Focus on architectural issues in [Shenker et al. 1996]
Internet pricing is needed.
Time-dependent pricing Traffic shaping with off-peak usage incentives. [El-Sayed et al. 2011]
Static discounts (two-period ToD)
Dynamic pricing Practiced for voice calls (e.g., location-based). [The Economist 2009]
Adopted in Africa & India.
Needs new theory for dynamic data pricing. [Joe-Wong et al. 2011]
New architecture & systems implementation. [Ha et al. 2012a]
Differentiated, Tiered data plans with various QoS. [Ericsson 2011]
app-based pricing App-specific “zero-rating,” app bundles. [Goldstein 2012]
their data usage by controlling the bandwidth rates of different applications. Research
on in-home Internet usage has showed that such applications enhance user awareness
of data usage and that there is a consumer demand for tools that help them under-
stand their data usage [Chetty et al. 2010; Chetty et al. 2012]. However, the interfaces
of these applications for both wired and wireless networks must be carefully designed
in order to facilitate user engagement [Chetty et al. 2011; Sen et al. 2013].
Client-side usage monitoring applications can go far beyond monitoring usage, espe-
cially if integrated with an ISP pricing plan. For instance, the client-side architecture
for dynamic pricing can incorporate a module to display current and, if known, future
prices as well as usage and spending. In fact, if future prices are known, e.g., day-ahead
dynamic pricing, one can even go a step further and incorporate a module that auto-
matically schedules some delay-tolerant applications to less expensive times of the day
[Ha et al. 2012b]. Such an “autopilot mode” for usage decisions incorporates a form of
bandwidth control into wireless devices, and integrating it with the prices offered can
help make dynamic pricing viable for ISPs.
7.4. Emerging Pricing Plans
A new pricing option that US ISPs are offering is a “shared data plan,” which allows
users to share their data cap across multiple devices, at a premium for each additional
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device [Buckley 2012; Galbraith 2011]. Rogers in Canada has been offering such plans
on a promotional basis since 2011 [Electronista 2011]. Orange of France Telecom has
also started such a plan in Austria that allows iPad owners to share one allotment of
data with a phone, and 38% of iPad owners on its network now subscribe to this plan
[Fried 2011]. Sharing a data cap across multiple devices may induce more efficient
usage of the quota per consumer. However, an open research question is to understand
shared data plans’ impact on usage and quota dynamics, with field trials to understand
the trade-offs between fairly sharing the caps across devices.
In dealing with the growing problem of bandwidth demand, researchers from
Alcatel-Lucent have recently proposed static time-dependent discounts for incentiviz-
ing off-peak capacity usage [El-Sayed et al. 2011]. They also presented policy and QoS
mechanisms to implement traffic shaping with off-peak usage incentives to users.
Another interesting trend emerging in several parts of the world, particularly in
Asia and Africa, is that of a larger scale adoption of dynamic pricing for voice calls
[The Economist 2009]. As the demand for data, and in particular mobile broadband,
grows, there will be a need for new architectures and systems, as reported by Ha
et al. [2012a] and Joe-Wong et al. [2011] in the context of pilot-trial results for a
dynamic time-dependent usage-based pricing system called TUBE (Time-dependent
Usage-based Broadband price Engineering) [DataMi 2012; Ha et al. 2012b].
Differentiated pricing for broadband [Ericsson 2011], e.g., application-based pric-
ing of data, is also a trend that is likely to receive more attention from industry. As
noted previously, ISPs are exploring new ways to attract customers by “zero-rating”
or bundling certain applications. A related direction for future research is that of
data plans with sponsored content in which user’s access fees are subsidized by the
content providers or advertisers. By offering such plans, content providers can incen-
tivize users to consume their content, and thus increase their advertising revenue.
Sponsored content pricing can be modeled as a two-sided market; using game theory,
Andrews et al. [2013] derived the optimal pricing policies for an ISP. However, such
a pricing scheme could be viewed as non-neutral, which may hinder its adoption. To
avoid this issue, Sheng et al. [2013] suggested a platform that allows content providers
to subsidize a certain dollar amount of users’ traffic, which need not correspond to traf-
fic from that content provider. In exchange, users agree to view advertisements, which
can help generate content provider revenue.
A summary of these potential future trends is given in Table III.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we draw attention to the growing problem of network congestion and
highlight some of the recent steps taken by ISPs to mitigate its effects. The projected
growth in demand for data, especially from mobile data and video traffic, is far more
than what can be supported even by the latest technological advances, e.g., 4G/LTE and
WiFi offloading, due to expensive backhauling and increasing wired network conges-
tion. Consequently, ISPs have been aggressively using pricing as a congestion control
tool.
The basic idea of congestion pricing has been known in the networking community
for several decades, but only now have conditions demanded that it be put into prac-
tice. In this survey, we first outline the various threats to the sustainability and eco-
nomic viability of the Internet ecosystem from the perspectives of ISPs, consumers,
and content providers. We then highlight the role that pricing can play in alleviating
network congestion and in balancing the functionality goals of data networks, followed
by a detailed discussion of the technological, socioeconomic, and regulatory challenges
to pricing innovation and related open problems. We review many known data net-
work pricing proposals, both static and dynamic, and discuss the extent to which some
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of these have been adopted by ISPs, drawing parallels to existing pricing practices
in electricity markets and road networks. We also discuss the predominant trends in
access pricing and the need for new architecture, field trials, and interdisciplinary
research for realizing more innovative dynamic pricing solutions such as day-ahead
time- and usage-dependent pricing, app-based pricing, etc.
The material presented in this paper seeks to inform networking researchers about
the existing works on access pricing, the ongoing developments in pricing plans, and
the research challenges that need to be accounted for in shaping a new research agenda
on smart data pricing.
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